In the initial stages of the Kargil conflict, when the Army was trying to assess the extent of Pakistan's intrusion, another war was also in progress. According to then Kargil Brigade Commander Brig Surinder Singh's representation to the Army Chief, submitted after he was removed from Kargil on June 9, he and his immediate superior, GOC, Maj Gen V.S. Budhwar, were pulling in different directions.
The first tremors dated back to December 1998 but ironically, the situation reached a flashpoint just when the Kargil conflict was hotting up. The brigadier wrote an angry letter to his GOC on June 4, following which he was removed from command on June 9. In his representation to the Army Chief, Brig Singh asked to be reinstated as commander of the 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade in Kargil.
An Army spokesperson, however, defends Brig Singh's removal citing ``operational inadequacies'' but declines to go into details. ``Though unfortunate, the removal of a field commander during battle is often necessary andshould not be questioned,'' he said.
But in his June 4 letter, Brig Singh blamed Major Gen Budhwar for the inadequacies in the conduct of operations. Maj Gen Budhwar could not be contacted for comment but an Army spokesperson said that no further blame could be apportioned since the Chief of Staff, Northern Commmand, has already been asked to go into these aspects of the case.
Brig Singh claimed that he was denied adequate backup despite his requests. The highlights of his disagreement with Maj Gen Budhwar, according to the representation, are:
In the Kaskar operations, which began on May 15, no air support was allotted to him despite indications of the magnitude of the enemy. He claimed that no additional troops were provided despite repeated assertions that clearing of enemy intrusion in the area would require at least one more battalion. Even after the wireless intercept regarding a likely enemy attempt to capture Point 5299, he had been left to fend for himself without additional troops, he says. ``With two enemy companies, as assessed by you, how is it possible to take it with a battalion? Not withstanding that, we will make a sincere, bold attempt and capture some positions and also get behind the enemy today,'' he wrote.
Referring to the Chorbatla sub-sector, Brig Singh claimed that its remoteness made it impossible for him to exercise effective command and control. He contested the GOC's decision to hand over its command to the Deputy Brigade Commander, saying that as the Commander, he needed to personally project himself to his troops.
Without any consultation, the GOC had put Brig Singh's ``meagre integral resources'', including troops, engineers and signals resources under the command of the 56 Infantry Brigade, 70 Infantry Brigade and in the Chorbatla sector, ``leaving me high and dry.''
It is not known how Maj Gen Budhwar reacted to these objections. Officers say that only an inquiry will uncover the truth. But it is well-known that success came only when additionaltroops of other formations were inducted.Apparently, no preparations for a battle of this magnitude in the area had been made. In his June 4 letter, Brig Singh complained that his underground operations room, enlargements and maps had been tken over by the Division.
He said that his staff had been asked ``most discourteously'' by the Divisional Colonel GS to stay away from the underground operations room.He said that the Brigade HQ was working from an extremely unsafe structure made of CGI sheets and that his Deputy Commander had informed him of a systemic collapse there. He complained that he had been shifted around a number of times on ``fire-fighting actions without explaining any reason or concept of the operations.'' He suggested that the Divisional HQ should be shifted either to Budhkharbu or Khalsi, so as to be equidistant from all brigades.
On June 9, Brig Surinder Singh was informed that he was being replaced by Brig O.P. Nanderjog. The following day he wrote to Lt Gen Krishen Pal, GOC of 15Corps, requesting a personal interview: ``I have serious professional differences with my GOC which have been placed on record and that is why I ask for your interview and not his.'' On June 15, he wrote to Lt Gen Krishen Pal again, stating that his removal was ``unwarranted, extremely unjust and ignominious,'' and he listed the problems he faced, the measures taken and how he conducted the operations.
These letters and the one to the Army Chief on June 28 are a critical commentary on the conduct of operations in the initial stages. In the Batalik sector, Brig Singh claims, when a platoon of 3 Punjab discovered the intrusion, he took immediate action to push troops along certain passes and also mobilised troops to encircle the enemy by placing them on certain heights (Point 5285 in Sq NQ 1292 and Point 5305 in Sq NQ 2691). ``However, the troops were ordered back by the GOC and today, we are battling hard to get these points,'' he said.
Did heavy casualties occur due to faulty operations? Yes, argues BrigSurinder Singh. Claiming credit for containing the enemy on certain heights including Tiger Hill, he said he had established a firm base for the capture of Point 5140 and Tololing Heights by placing about three companies-worth of troops behind enemy positions at Point 5241. He had intended to attack the Tololing feature from the rear, first taking Point 5140 to make Point 4590 (Tololing Heights) untenable.
He alleged that the attack on Point 4590 on June 12-13 was launched frontally resulted in heavy casualties. He said that instead of being given additional troops and freedom of action, he was relieved by another Brigade in the middle of operations.
About operations in the Drass sector, the Brigadier claimed he was sent to contain the crisis there despite the sector having been placed under 70 Infantry Brigade since April 24. He said that the Kaksar operation failed in May-June due to lack of adequate troops, air recce and artillery support.
;.. But why was he divested of command? ``I have had seriousprofessional differences with GOC 3 Infantry Division during preparation stage, concept of operations and conduct of battle and my actions and plans have not been projected in the correct perspective,'' he has stated. But the Army spokesman said that his removal was recommended by the entire chain of command.
The first tremors dated back to December 1998 but ironically, the situation reached a flashpoint just when the Kargil conflict was hotting up. The brigadier wrote an angry letter to his GOC on June 4, following which he was removed from command on June 9. In his representation to the Army Chief, Brig Singh asked to be reinstated as commander of the 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade in Kargil.
An Army spokesperson, however, defends Brig Singh's removal citing ``operational inadequacies'' but declines to go into details. ``Though unfortunate, the removal of a field commander during battle is often necessary andshould not be questioned,'' he said.
But in his June 4 letter, Brig Singh blamed Major Gen Budhwar for the inadequacies in the conduct of operations. Maj Gen Budhwar could not be contacted for comment but an Army spokesperson said that no further blame could be apportioned since the Chief of Staff, Northern Commmand, has already been asked to go into these aspects of the case.
Brig Singh claimed that he was denied adequate backup despite his requests. The highlights of his disagreement with Maj Gen Budhwar, according to the representation, are:
In the Kaskar operations, which began on May 15, no air support was allotted to him despite indications of the magnitude of the enemy. He claimed that no additional troops were provided despite repeated assertions that clearing of enemy intrusion in the area would require at least one more battalion. Even after the wireless intercept regarding a likely enemy attempt to capture Point 5299, he had been left to fend for himself without additional troops, he says. ``With two enemy companies, as assessed by you, how is it possible to take it with a battalion? Not withstanding that, we will make a sincere, bold attempt and capture some positions and also get behind the enemy today,'' he wrote.
Referring to the Chorbatla sub-sector, Brig Singh claimed that its remoteness made it impossible for him to exercise effective command and control. He contested the GOC's decision to hand over its command to the Deputy Brigade Commander, saying that as the Commander, he needed to personally project himself to his troops.
Without any consultation, the GOC had put Brig Singh's ``meagre integral resources'', including troops, engineers and signals resources under the command of the 56 Infantry Brigade, 70 Infantry Brigade and in the Chorbatla sector, ``leaving me high and dry.''
It is not known how Maj Gen Budhwar reacted to these objections. Officers say that only an inquiry will uncover the truth. But it is well-known that success came only when additionaltroops of other formations were inducted.Apparently, no preparations for a battle of this magnitude in the area had been made. In his June 4 letter, Brig Singh complained that his underground operations room, enlargements and maps had been tken over by the Division.
He said that his staff had been asked ``most discourteously'' by the Divisional Colonel GS to stay away from the underground operations room.He said that the Brigade HQ was working from an extremely unsafe structure made of CGI sheets and that his Deputy Commander had informed him of a systemic collapse there. He complained that he had been shifted around a number of times on ``fire-fighting actions without explaining any reason or concept of the operations.'' He suggested that the Divisional HQ should be shifted either to Budhkharbu or Khalsi, so as to be equidistant from all brigades.
On June 9, Brig Surinder Singh was informed that he was being replaced by Brig O.P. Nanderjog. The following day he wrote to Lt Gen Krishen Pal, GOC of 15Corps, requesting a personal interview: ``I have serious professional differences with my GOC which have been placed on record and that is why I ask for your interview and not his.'' On June 15, he wrote to Lt Gen Krishen Pal again, stating that his removal was ``unwarranted, extremely unjust and ignominious,'' and he listed the problems he faced, the measures taken and how he conducted the operations.
These letters and the one to the Army Chief on June 28 are a critical commentary on the conduct of operations in the initial stages. In the Batalik sector, Brig Singh claims, when a platoon of 3 Punjab discovered the intrusion, he took immediate action to push troops along certain passes and also mobilised troops to encircle the enemy by placing them on certain heights (Point 5285 in Sq NQ 1292 and Point 5305 in Sq NQ 2691). ``However, the troops were ordered back by the GOC and today, we are battling hard to get these points,'' he said.
Did heavy casualties occur due to faulty operations? Yes, argues BrigSurinder Singh. Claiming credit for containing the enemy on certain heights including Tiger Hill, he said he had established a firm base for the capture of Point 5140 and Tololing Heights by placing about three companies-worth of troops behind enemy positions at Point 5241. He had intended to attack the Tololing feature from the rear, first taking Point 5140 to make Point 4590 (Tololing Heights) untenable.
He alleged that the attack on Point 4590 on June 12-13 was launched frontally resulted in heavy casualties. He said that instead of being given additional troops and freedom of action, he was relieved by another Brigade in the middle of operations.
About operations in the Drass sector, the Brigadier claimed he was sent to contain the crisis there despite the sector having been placed under 70 Infantry Brigade since April 24. He said that the Kaksar operation failed in May-June due to lack of adequate troops, air recce and artillery support.
;.. But why was he divested of command? ``I have had seriousprofessional differences with GOC 3 Infantry Division during preparation stage, concept of operations and conduct of battle and my actions and plans have not been projected in the correct perspective,'' he has stated. But the Army spokesman said that his removal was recommended by the entire chain of command.